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In the last few years edited books discussing issues that surround the teaching and 
learning of mathematical proof have been published at an alarming rate (e.g. Boero 
2007; Stylianou et al. 2009; Hanna and De Villiers in press). This is not surprising in 
view of the growing research literature on proof and proving in educational settings. 
While most mathematicians and mathematics educators consider proof to be a 
defining characteristic of mathematics, proof is known to be difficult for students to 
master, and epistemologically controversial amongst both philosophers and research 
mathematicians. As a consequence there are complex and unsettled issues 
surrounding how proof can and should be taught at all levels of education. Current 
research efforts include investigating students' beliefs about the nature of proof, 
different approaches to reading and validating proofs, and instructional designs that 
can facilitate a deeper appreciation of proof in the classroom. 
 
Reid and Knipping (R&K) have made an interesting and unusual contribution to this 
growing literature. Rather than compile another edited volume bringing together new 
empirical or theoretical analyses, or write a short chapter reviewing the literature on 
proof as part of a larger handbook, R&K have attempted to produce a lengthy, 
coherent synthesis of this entire subsection of the research literature. In a sense their 
book can be seen as an advanced level textbook, suitable for beginning doctoral or 
masters level students who may be writing dissertations related to proof.  
 
Compared to other disciplines, such introductions to the literature are surprisingly rare 
in mathematics education. As R&K point out in their introduction, getting to grips 
with a large body of literature is a difficult and daunting task (especially a literature 
that is as fragmented and contradictory as the educational literature on proof). So, the 
existence of a book-length synthesis of a subsection of the literature is extremely 
valuable, but what characteristics should it have? Several immediately spring to mind: 
such books should faithfully present other authors' views, have comprehensive 
coverage of the literature, and should present debates and controversies in a balanced 
but critical fashion. In the remainder of this review I discuss R&K's contribution with 
reference to these three criteria.  
 
With respect to the first criterion, in my view R&K accurately and carefully present 
the positions of the authors they discuss (although I did not always agree with the 
arguments they developed based on these summaries, of which more below). With 
respect to the second, the book's coverage is broad, falling into three main sections. 
The first concerns itself with a discussion of the nature of proof, considering historical 
and epistemological perspectives in turn. It concludes with an interesting and helpful 
discussion of the perspectives adopted by different research traditions. The second 
section of the book delves deeper into the literature by synthesising empirical findings 
regarding several "important research foci" (within this category R&K include 
amongst other things the role of proof, the difference between proof and 
argumentation, approaches to teaching proof, and schemes for the classification of 
arguments). The third section concentrates on a detailed discussion of the processes 
students adopt when proving. Notably, this section is somewhat different to the others 
as it is primarily based on R&K's own research work, rather than a synthesis of the 
literature. The book concludes with a discussion of teaching implications, and 
suggestions for future research. What then, of the second criterion? Other than some 
minor cavils1, I think the book covers the literature well. I would be happy to 
recommend it to an incoming PhD student to use as an introduction to the field. 
 
What of the remaining criterion? Do R&K present their synthesis in a reliable and 
balanced fashion? In my view they do. Although there were issues on which I 
disagreed with R&K (discussed below), in general the presentation seemed to me to 
be a constructive and helpful representation of the current state of the literature. 
 
I did find some exceptions to this rule; places where I felt R&K's treatment was 
unduly simplistic or offering a partial summary. The clearest came early on in the 
book when R&K presented their take on various philosophical accounts of 
mathematics. R&K suggest that there are four basic philosophies: a priorist, 
infallibilist, quasi-empiricist and social-constructivist. The first, they say, is 
characterised by a belief in platonic objects (real mathematical objects that exist 
independently of human cognition) that are accurately and completely described by 
axiomatic structures, coupled with a belief that deductive inferences from those 
axioms are truth preserving. R&K tell us that since the discovery of non-Euclidean 
geometries "most mathematicians" have abandoned this view. In contrast, an 
infallibilist, according to R&K, accepts the truth-preserving nature of deductive 
inferences, but rejects the suggestion that mathematical objects exist in some platonic 
sense. Quasi-empiricists, in contrast, agree with the infallibilists about the non-
existence of mathematical objects, but reject the standard view of the relationship 
between theorems and axioms: deductive reasoning does not transmit truth from 
axioms to theorems, rather, following Lakatos (1976), falsity is transmitted from 
theorems to axioms. R&K characterise their final position, adopted by social 
constructivists, as being associated with a rejection of the unique status of the 
deductive method. As deduction is just a social construction, on this view what counts 
as a valid argument will vary from community to community and culture to culture. 
 
R&K suggest that these four positions constitute a single dimension onto which 
researchers' beliefs can be mapped. But it is extremely hard to see how many 
respectable modern philosophical positions can be coherently categorised using these 
labels. As a concrete example, consider Brown's (2008) rather attractive version of 
platonism. Brown accepts that mathematical objects exist independently of humans in 
some platonic world (like R&K's a priorists), but he rejects the assumption that they 
are perfectly described by axioms (unlike R&K's a priorists). Instead he argues that 
axioms are hypotheses (like R&K's infallibilists) that attempt to describe the platonic 
world, but he does not believe that deductive reasoning obtains mathematical truths 
(unlike R&K's infallibilists). Instead Brown suggests that the goal of deductive 
reasoning is to test axioms (i.e. hypotheses about platonic objects) by deriving 
consequences from them and assessing them against one's intuitions of the platonic 
world (a method essentially identical to that favoured by R&K's quasi-empiricists). 
Indeed, Brown would go further, and suggest that Lakatos may himself have been a 
platonist. Finally, Brown, like R&K's social-constructivists, agrees that deductive 
reasoning is socially constructed, and holds out hope that one day better methods of 
revealing truths about mathematical objects may be found (in particular, methods that 
don't fall foul of the incompleteness theorems). If it is possible to adopt a coherent 
philosophical position by taking some aspects of each of R&K's four positions and 
rejecting others, it seems hard to justify placing them on a single dimension.2  
 
A second point of disagreement was with R&K's argument, presented throughout the 
book, that the multiplicity of research perspectives which exist in the literature should 
be considered a strength, because  "a diversity of perspectives offers opportunities to 
make sense of phenomena that might be seen in a limited way from a single 
perspective" (p. xiv). Unfortunately the authors failed to convince me of this 
argument, and indeed I found some of their (very competently arranged) summaries 
of the literature to be rather depressing. Take, for example, their review of argument 
classification schemes: R&K point out that what they would call an "empirical-
perceptual" argument would be classified by Bell as "extrapolation", by the 
preformalists as "experimental", by Balacheff as "naive empiricism" and by van 
Dormolen as an argument of the "first level". Similarly they explain that, depending 
on which perspective is adopted, the same argument might be classified as 
"symbolic", "a complete deductive explanation", "formal scientific", "mathematical 
proof", or of the "third level". Are these numerous labels for the same (or at least 
extremely similar) phenomena really a sign of the strength of the literature? Or are 
they a sign that as a discipline we have failed to build a cumulative body of 
knowledge? 
 
While I was reading these sections I was reminded of comments made by two 
influential researchers that have stuck with me. First, John Mason's lament that 
mathematics education consists of "a plethora of distinctions, sometimes several 
labels for at best subtly distinct distinctions, and sometimes the same label is used for 
different distinctions" (2009, 11). Second, Tommy Dreyfus's suggestion that 
mathematics educators "tend to invent theories, or at least theoretical ideas, at a pace 
faster than we produce data to possibly refute our theories" (2006, 78). R&K’s 
summaries of the various argumentation classification schemes provide ample 
evidence for those who might doubt the wisdom of Mason and Dreyfus’s comments. 
So, unlike R&K, I do not see this proliferation of near identical classification systems 
as a strength, but rather as an indication of researchers' unwillingness or inability to 
build on each others' ideas. 
 
Nevertheless, across the book the points where I disagreed with R&K's arguments 
were comfortably outnumbered by the points where I found myself appreciating the 
thrust and sophistication of their discussion.  But although I did appreciate the efforts 
of the authors in producing their book, I felt that they have been rather let down by 
their publishers. An example, the irony of which some may enjoy, is the consistent 
misspelling of "rigorous" throughout the text (as "rigourous"). If publishers aspire to 
be more than mere printers, then their copy-editing procedures really should be 
capable of spotting errors like this. 
 
In summary, R&K's book is an extremely valuable addition to the growing 
mathematics education literature on proof. There is no doubt that it will be of 
considerable use to researchers who wish to familiarise themselves with the research 
literature. But the book's influence could be wider still: for a group of researchers that 
concentrate on pedagogy, mathematics educators devote surprisingly little effort 
towards developing pedagogical materials for the teaching of research-level 
mathematics education. Hopefully, R&K's book will provide the impetus for other 
researchers to write similar syntheses of further areas of the mathematics education 
literature. 
 
Notes 
 
1. I was disappointed to see little or no discussion of the small but growing literature 
on the reading of (rather than the construction of) mathematical proofs. Reading 
proofs seems to be a critical (but under-researched) aspect of how students engage 
with higher-level mathematics. It also seemed strange to omit discussion of influential 
papers by Weber (2001, 2008) and Stylianides (2007). 
 
2. A further problem for R&K's characterisation comes from Balaguer's surprisingly 
compelling argument that platonism and "fictionalism" (similar to R&K's description 
of social-constructivism) are in fact the same philosophy (Balaguer 2008). 
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